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Abstract 
 
Whether the active M&A in Japan has brought about positive or negative impacts on the 
volume of employment is not only the concern of each firm, but also the center of national 
interests in the context of national industrial policies. M&A activities, however, vary in terms 
of micro behavior of each firm such as motivation, management and organization as well as 
of the industrial category that each firm belongs to, and the employment consequences may 
differ depending on the types of firms’ micro behavior and the industrial sectors. 
This chapter tried to come up with some aggregated consequences of M&A in Japan on 
employment volume on empirical bases, by the M&A categories in which we take firms’ 
behaviors and industrial sectors into consideration to maximum extent. To be specific, we 
examined employment-effects of M&A in Japan by the deal type (merger and acquisition) and 
by the sector (manufacturing and non-manufacturing), tracing the effects in the long term, 
using large dataset with 9,880 sample firms and 2,530 M&A cases for the period from 1995 to 
2008. 
Our main findings were: the “acquisition” with the key role of “extension and growth” 
proved to have positive effects in the dynamic terms on target firms’ employment, mainly in 
manufacturing sector with high labor productivity. On the other hand, the “merger” with key 
function of “consolidation” turned out to have negative impacts dynamically on post-merger 
firms’ employment, mainly in non-manufacturing sector with low labor productivity. The 
strategic implication might to be that the different employment responses to M&A events 
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing reflect the difference in labor productivity 
between them, i.e. the dual structure of Japanese economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present some empirical evidence of the effects of merger 
and acquisition (hereafter referred to simply as M&A) on employment in Japan. Our research 
question is whether the active M&A in Japan has brought about positive or negative impacts 
on the volume of employment, which is not only the concern of each firm, but also the center 
of national interests in the context of national industrial policies. M&A activities, however, 
vary in terms of micro behavior of each firm such as motivation, management and 
organization as well as of the industrial category that each firm belongs to, and the 
employment consequences may differ depending on the types of firms’ micro behavior and 
the industrial sectors. Our role in this paper is to come up with an aggregated consequence of 
M&A on employment volume on empirical bases, by the M&A categories in which we take 
firms’ behaviors and industrial sectors into consideration to maximum extent. This study 
concentrates on the case of Japan. Japan has experienced an M&A boom since the latter half 
of the 1990s, following the global surge of M&A. The M&A activities in Japan reached a 
peak in 2006, in which the number of M&A cases amounted to 2,775, and its deal value 
deserved about 15 trillion yen (nearly three percent of GDP). In spite of this reality, empirical 
studies on Japanese M&A, including its employment effects, have been extremely limited in 
the literature on firm behavior. The evidence presented in our study, can also contribute to 
providing an implication in the context of Japanese industrial structure and policy. 
The analytical focuses in this study, which are somewhat different from the previous 
literatures, are as follows. First, we examine employment effects of M&A, by the deal type, 
i.e. merger and acquisition. The employment impacts of M&A may vary depending on a 
variety of typologies of M&A motives and functions. It seems, however, to be difficult to 
work out the employment impacts by M&A motives and strategies through econometric 
methods, since the micro data of firms at a nation-wide level do not usually include the 
information on the M&A motives and strategies of individual firms. Thus, we have to seek for 
a second-best approach for estimating employment effects by econometric methods, as well as 
for taking M&A motives and functions into account. We herein depend on the typology of 
Miyajima (2007a), which classified M&A activities into the deal type, and described the 
functions of each deal type. Miyajima (2007a) emphasized that the “extension and growth” 
function fits in with the acquisition type since it is rational for firm growth to keep the 
independence of target firms avoiding merging costs, while the “consolidation” function 
essentially fits in with the merge type.
2
 Then, we hypothesize that the type of “merger” with 
“consolidation” a key function would rather include more of the elements that lead to 
employment reduction (e.g. curtailing administration costs, reorganizing overlapped offices), 
whereas the type of “acquisition” with “extension and growth” a key function would include 
more of the elements that make employment expand (e.g. strengthening core competency, 
extending projects). 
Second, we further classify M&A by the sector, i.e. manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing. We would herein like to present a hypothesis that manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing would produce different employment effects of M&A, from the viewpoint 
of the difference in their labor productivities in the context of Japanese economy. McKinsey 
(2000) reported the dual structure of Japanese economy: the labor productivity of 
                                                 
2 It is true that there are many exceptional examples in the archetypical division of Miyajima (2007a), such as ‘strong acquires’ making 
rationalizations in ‘weak’ target firms. In addition, it should also be noted that the division of Miyajima (2007a) is adaptable to Japan, and not 
always to other countries, since there are differences in the preference for acquisitions and mergers among countries. For instance, the 
acquisitions, which maintain the legal independence of the target firms, are more common in Japan than in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, due to fewer restrictions on listed firms and a strong desire to maintain corporate cultures in Japan (see Miyajima 2007b). 
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export-driven manufacturing sector in Japan is 20 percent higher than that in U.S., whereas 
the labor productivity of domestic services sector in Japan is 37 percent lower than that in U.S. 
economy. The reports interpreted it in such a way that non-manufacturing sector is 
small-scaled, and insulated from competition by subsidies, regulations and other domestic 
factors, whereas manufacturing sector is exposed to fierce global competition. Thus, we 
hypothesize that in the chance of M&A events, the employment curtailment occurs more 
easily in non-manufacturing sector than in manufacturing sector, since non-manufacturing 
sector may hold excess employment under the low level of labor productivity. 
Third, we construct panel data for estimation with 9,880 sample firms and 2,530 M&A 
cases for the period from 1995 to 2008, using extensive micro data of firms’ financial 
statements. The data cover the control samples of firms that have not experienced M&A, 
which are necessary to extract pure effects of M&A. The samples also include unlisted firms 
as well as listed firms on stock markets. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the recent trends in M&A in Japan; 
Section 3 represents the empirical framework, estimation results and discussions; and the last 
section offers our conclusions. 
 
2. Recent Trends in M&A in Japan 
 
Japan has experienced a so-called M&A boom since the latter half of the 1990s. Table 1 
and Figure 1 indicates the remarkable increase in the number of M&A cases, from around 500 
cases in the mid 1990s to around 2,000 cases in the 2000s, although showing a decline after 
2008 due to the global financial crisis. The number of M&A reached a peak in 2006, in which 
the cases amounted to 2,775, and their deal values deserved about 15 trillion yen (nearly three 
percent of GDP). 
We herein describe the M&A activities since the 1980s in brief by referring to Table 1. 
The first boom, in rather small scale, came in the latter half of the 1980s. The major cases in 
that period were the ones in which Japanese firms acquired foreign firms (IN-OUT style in 
Table 1). The “bubble economy” made Japanese companies go ahead into foreign markets, 
with the Sony Corporation’s acquisition of CBS Records Inc. and Columbia Pictures 
Entertainment a typical example. The second boom, in larger scale and longer term, started in 
the latter half of the 1990s. In this boom, domestic M&A (IN-IN style in Table 1) took a 
dominant role to pursue industry consolidation amid the burst of “bubble economy” and the 
fierce competition with emerging Asian economies. In the steel industry, for example, two of 
Japan’s major steelmakers – Kawasaki Steel Corp. and NKK Corp. were merged into JFE 
Holdings. The legal system reforms such as the introduction of new accounting rules on a 
group-wide basis, also contributed to this boom. Another type of cross-border M&A in which 
Japanese companies were acquired by  foreign ones (OUT-IN style in Table 1), became 
active since the end of the 1990s, although the share of the number stayed at around ten 
percent. This type of M&A could often be seen as a case for strengthening the domestic 
presence of foreign companies, with the Citigroup’s acquisition of the Nikko Cordial group a 
typical example. The activated role of foreign investment funds also contributed to its 
increase. 
We next touch upon the question on what factors have driven the M&A waves in Japan. 
There has been a rich set of literature on the predictors of M&A waves in general. Harford 
(2005) described two general classes of models to explain M&A waves: the neoclassical 
model, in which industries responding to shocks reorganize through M&A, and thereby create 
a clustering of merger activity; and, the behavioral model, in which rational managers take 
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advantage of consistent pricing errors in the market to buy real assets with overvalued stock. 
Harford (2005) compared the two models in his analysis, and supported the neoclassical 
model –economic, regulatory and technological shocks drive industry merger waves– as 
modified to include a role for capital liquidity. Concerning with the Japan’s case, Arikawa and 
Miyajima (2007) examined which of the two models as the neoclassical and 
stock-market-driven ones was applicable to the Japan’s M&A waves. Their findings supported 
not the “market-driven” model but the neoclassical one, showing that the 1990s-2000s M&A 
boom in Japan came from some sort of shock that impacted on the growth opportunities and 
profitability of industry
3
. Miyajima (2007b) stated that the recent, rapid increase in M&A in 
Japan has been driven by economic shocks - both positive and negative - such as 
technological innovation and sharp falls in demand, and that the increase in M&A has 
facilitated resource allocation in terms of downsizing less profitable divisions and expanding 
high-growth divisions. These findings that the M&A in Japan has been driven by real shocks, 
lead us to recognize the significance in examining the labor impact of the M&A in the latter 
section of this paper.  
 
3. Empirical Study 
 
We now turn to empirics. Before launching into the analysis, we first clarify the 
methodology and data. We then exhibit the estimation results, and discuss them.  
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
For the estimation, we adopt the labor demand function. The labor demand function 
contributes to extracting the pure labor impacts that are caused only by M&A events, by 
controlling the other economic variables that are theoretically considered to affect labor 
demand. We adopt an ordinary dynamic labor demand function, derived by Nickell (1984) 
and Bresson et al. (1996) and employed by Conyon et al. (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), 
and Kubo and Saito (2007). It assumed that firms determine the optimal path of their 
employment by minimizing their costs, under the conditions that firms are output-constrained, 
have a technological constraint which can be represented by a Cobb–Douglas production 
function, and face continuous quadratic adjustment costs. The empirically testable labor 
demand model can finally be derived in such a way that the actual level of employment is 
expressed as a function of lagged values of employment and other determinants such as 
production and factor costs (user cost of capital and wage). We then specify an estimation 
equation by adding M&A dummy variables to the labor demand model, so that the 
coefficients of M&A dummy variables purely signify the M&A’s impacts on employment, and 
other factors’ impacts on employment are absorbed into labor demand function. 
We first specify the labor demand function as follows: 
 
Eit = const. +  Eit-1 + 1Qit + 2 Qit-1 + 1Wit + 2Wit-1 + 1Cit + 2Cit-1 + ηtDt + θjIDj + 
fi + it         (1) 
 
where Eit, Qit, Wit and Cit denote the logarithms of employment, real output, real wage, and 
user cost of capital regarding firm i in period t. Dt are a set of time dummies to account for 
technical progress and business cycle effects, IDj is a set of industry dummies to signify the 
                                                 
3 As well as testing the two hypotheses, they described the impact of legal reform on promoting M&A: the lifting of the ban on holding 
companies (1997), the introduction of stock transfer system (1999), tax incentive measures for revitalizing industry (1999), etc. 
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specific effect of the industry that a firm belongs to
4
, and fi is firm-specific fixed effects that 
reflects intra-firm differences in technology and management. it is an equation disturbance 
term. 
As we mentioned, the method of extracting the pure impacts of M&A on employment is to 
add M&A dummy variables to the labor demand function specified above. Following our 
analytical concern, we classify the dummy into the one for acquisition and the other for 
merger. Our estimation does not include time dummies, since the estimation period is limited 
to thirteen years, and since time dummies may have multicollinearity with the M&A dummies 
in the sense that the M&A activities can be influenced by business cycle. It also has to be 
noted that, due to data constraints, our estimation focuses on the employment effects of not 
the acquirer but the target firm in the cases of acquisition, and, in the case of merger, the firm 
that continues to exist after merger, which we call “post-merger firm” thereafter. For the 
purpose of capturing the dynamic employment effects of the M&A, we specify the equations 
for the baseline estimation covering ten-year lags in the following ways.  
 
Eit = const. +  Eit-1 + 1Qit + 2 Qit-1 + 1Wit + 2Wit-1 + 1Cit + 2Cit-1 + θjIDj + fi + it  
+ a0DAit + b0DMit 
+ a1DAit-1 + b1DMit-1 
+ a2DAit-2 + b2DMit-2 
･･･              
+ a10DAit-10 + b10DMit-10           (2) 
          
where DA and DM denote the dummy for acquisition and merger, respectively.
5
 For instance, 
DAit-n = 1 if the firm i is acquired by another firm in the period of t-n. The key statistics of 
interest, 0, measures the immediate impact of the M&A on labor demand in percentage terms 
relative to the non-M&A labor trends, and 1, 2,･･･ represent the dynamic impact on 
post-M&A employment. The case that n is significantly positive (negative), means that 
positive (negative) impacts of M&A on employment come out n years after the M&A event. 
We examine the dynamic impact until ten years later due to data constraints. The ordinary 
labor demand function expects positive sign of sale’s coefficient , negative sign of wage’s 
coefficient , and positive sign of the coefficient of user cost of capital . Our analysis further 
extends the baseline estimation above by classifying M&A dummies into manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sector. To be specific, the dummy for acquisition, DA, for instance, is 
divided into DA_m for manufacturing sector and DA_nm for non-manufacturing sector. 
Another focus of our analysis is concerned with estimation techniques. Equation (2) 
contains a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables, and thereby the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent. Obtaining consistent estimates 
requires the application of an instrumental variables estimator or Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). We herein adopt the system GMM estimator (two-step, robust) developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), who argue that additional 
instruments can be obtained in a dynamic model from panel data if we utilize the 
orthogonality conditions between lagged values of the dependent and the disturbances. We 
also present the test results for autocorrelations in the table that follows. 
 
                                                 
4 The industry classification (j = 43) follows that of the data source, the “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry”. 
5 On the estimation, we added other dummies related to M&A, i.e. the dummies for capital participation and increase, which do not 
accompany ownership changes. Since we could not get any significant coefficients on them, we omitted any explanation on their effects. 
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3.2 Database 
 
One of the contributions in our study consists in extensive database as we emphasized in 
Introduction. The database is constructed from two sources. The primary source for getting 
M&A information is the “MARR M&A DATA CD-ROM” presented by the “RECOF DATA 
Corporation”.6 We use this data source, since it provides M&A data with the wider coverage 
of the information on M&A activities in Japan than such international data sources as 
Bloomberg database and Thomson Financial one. This data source allows us to classify M&A 
activities into the deal type (merger and acquisition), and also into domestic and cross-border 
cases. In this data, the “merger” is defined to be a case in which firms are merged and a new 
legal entity is formed, and the “acquisition” is a case where more than 50 percent of the target 
firm’s equity is acquired by another firm. 
The micro-data for firm’s behaviors, i.e. employment, output, wage and user cost of 
capital is collected by the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, made 
by the Policy Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance in Japan. The data cover the 
control samples of firms that have not experienced M&A, which are necessary to extract pure 
effects of M&A. Our estimation targets the firms whose capital values are 600 million yen 
and over
7
, and whose sectors exclude those of finance and insurance
8
, due to the data 
availability of statistics. The sample firms, however, have wide coverage in that they include 
not only firms listed on the stock exchange markets in Japan, but also unlisted firm.
9
 The data 
for employment is derived from the item of “Number of employees” in the statistics.10 The 
data for output is from the “Sales” in the profit and loss statements. The data for wage is 
calculated by dividing the “Personnel expenses” by the “Number of employees”.11 The data 
for user cost of capital is from the “Interest expenses” in the profit and loss statements. We 
herein use nominal data, not real data, since our estimation period within thirteen years 
indicates price stability. 
We combine the data from two sources above, and construct panel data with 9,880 sample 
firms for the period from 1995 to 2008 after checking the data availability of both data 
sources. Table 2 shows that the total number of the M&A cases between 1996 and 2008 is 
2,530, including 626 cases of “acquisition”, and 1,904 of “merger”. The observed firms have 
the statistics of average (standard deviations) for employees: 1,165 (1,479); for million yen of 
sales: 86,887 (126,328); and for thousand yen of wages: 5,939 (2.367). 
 
3.3 Estimation Results 
 
Table 3a represents the results of the baseline estimation. The test results for 
autocorrelations indicate the validity of all the estimations from Equation (a) to (c), since all 
the AR(2) statistics reveal the absence of second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced errors. All the estimations represent that the inclusion of the lagged 
                                                 
6 The “RECOF DATA Corporation” is a name of private company, whose mission is to provide M&A related database. The “MARR M&A 
DATA CD-ROM” is a name of M&A database provided by the “RECOF DATA Corporation”. For the details, see 
http://www.recofdata.co.jp/english.do. 
7 This database covers the firms with their capital values below 600 million yen. But these firms’ data are collected by the sample survey in 
which the samples are replaced every year, thereby being impossible to be traced as time-series data on individual firm base. Thus we focus 
on the firms with their capital values 600 million yen and over, whose data are collected by complete survey. 
8 The statistics classify the sectors into manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The non-manufacturing sector covers construction, wholesale 
and retail trade, real estate, goods rental and leasing, information and communications, transport and postal activities, electricity, and 
services. 
9 If we focused on the listed firms, the sample size would be reduced from 9,880 firms towards less than 3,000 firms. 
10 This statistic counts on the part-time job workers as the number of employees. But the number is adjusted by the level equivalent to the 
full-time job workers. For instance, in case that there are two part-timers who work by half of a full-timer, they are counted as one employee. 
11 The “Personnel expenses” in this context means the sum of salaries and bonus for employees, which do not include any welfare expenses. 
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dependent variable of employment is positively discernable, thus implying inertia in firm 
employment and justifying forming the dynamic panel model; the coefficients of output, wage, 
and user cost of capital in the period t have expected signs at the significant level, whereas 
those in the period t-1 have opposite signs.
12
 As for the coefficients of the M&A dummies, 
positive employment impacts are significantly identified four or five years after M&A in the 
“acquisition” (hereafter we focus only on significant impacts). As for the case of the “merger”, 
negative effects come out three years after, while immediate effects are definitely positive.
13
 
Table 3b reports the outcomes of two-sector estimation. Regarding the “acquisition”, 
manufacturing sector shows positive and continuous employment effects two years after 
M&A, while non-manufacturing sector indicates positive impacts only five and six years after. 
On the other hand, in the “merger” case, negative and continuous impacts come out one year 
after in non-manufacturing sector, whereas clear dynamic effects do not come out in the 
manufacturing sector. In short, we found the positive dynamic effects of the “acquisition” on 
target firms’ employment mainly in manufacturing, and the negative dynamic effects of the 
“merger” on the post-merger firms’ employment mainly in non-manufacturing. 
 
3.4 Discussions 
 
We first clarify the goal of our paper here again. Our study examines the employment 
effects of M&A, by the deal type of merger and acquisition and by the sector of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing, in the dynamic terms covering ten years, by using the 
analytical framework of labor demand function. We propose the following hypotheses, and 
put them into the empirical tests. The first hypothesis, the one regarding with the deal type, is 
that the “acquisition” with the key function of “extension and growth” tends to have positive 
effects on employment, whereas the “merge” with the essential function of “consolidation” 
inclines to produce its negative impacts. The second hypothesis, the one on the sector, is that 
non-manufacturing with low labor productivity is more likely to receive negative impacts of 
M&A on employment than manufacturing with high productivity. 
We then discuss the empirical findings in the previous section in the context of our two 
hypotheses above. Our first finding about the “acquisition”, i.e. dynamic positive effects on 
target firms’ employment mainly in manufacturing, seems to be consistent with our 
hypotheses. The positive employment effects of the “acquisition” appear to reflect its 
“extension and growth” function, i.e. the one for strengthening core competency, extending 
projects, etc., if we follow the typology of Miyajima (2007a). And this positive employment 
effects appear to show up reasonably in manufacturing sector, which has less room to curtail 
employment volume under its higher labor productivity in Japan.  
Our second finding on the “merge”, i.e. dynamic negative effects on post-merger firms’ 
employment mainly in non-manufacturing, seems to be also consistent with our hypotheses. 
The negative employment impacts of the “merge” appear to reflect its “consolidation” 
function, i.e. the one for curtailing administration costs, reorganizing overlapped offices, etc., 
according to the typology of Miyajima (2007a). In addition, this negative employment effects 
                                                 
12 The wage has larger degree of coefficient with an opposite sign in the period t-1. This may come from the problem of data source. The 
Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry is based on each firm’s financial statements. Each firm’s financial statement 
differs in the starting month of fiscal year. The data may, therefore, include lagged figures in case that a firm adopts a fiscal year with an 
earlier starting month. 
13 The immediate positive effect of the “merger” is a natural, senseless result, since our analysis traces only the post-merger firms’ 
employment, not merged firms’ one, through the pre-merger period. Thus, we hereafter omit explanation on immediate merger effects. Kubo 
and Saito (2007) represented a negative impact as an immediate employment effect of the “merger”. This is because they trace the 
employment of both merging and merged firms even through the pre-merger period, thereby being able to estimate a net effect of the 
“merger”. 
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appear to come out reasonably in non-manufacturing sector, which seems to have excess 
employment volume under its lower labor productivity in Japan. Some of the previous studies, 
e.g. Conyon et al. (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), and Kubo and Saito (2007), which 
dealt with only the “merger” case, verified its negative employment impacts, although Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2004) and Kubo and Saito (2007) estimated only its immediate effects. In this 
sense, our finding on the “merger” impacts is consistent with the previous studies’ outcomes, 
except that its negative effects concentrate on non-manufacturing in our analysis. 
We can summarize the discussions above as follows. The “acquisition” with the key role 
of “extension and growth” proved to have positive effects in the dynamic terms on target 
firms’ employment, mainly in manufacturing sector with high labor productivity; On the other 
hand, the “merger” with key function of “consolidation” turned out to have negative impacts 
dynamically on post-merger firms’ employment, mainly in non-manufacturing sector with low 
labor productivity. The implication peculiar to Japanese M&A cases consists in the different 
employment responses to M&A events between manufacturing and non-manufacturing, which 
reflect the difference in labor productivity between them, i.e. the dual structure of Japanese 
economy. For the managers in non-manufacturing, the “merger” may be an effective 
instrument to rationalize excess employment, while for the managers in manufacturing, the 
“acquisition” may be an opportunity to expand and diversify the projects with high 
productivity. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the dynamic effects of M&A on employment in 
Japan. The main contributions are: targeting employment effects of M&A, examining them by 
the deal type (merger and acquisition) and by the sector (manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing), tracing the effects in the long term, using large dataset with 9,880 sample 
firms and 2,530 M&A cases for the period from 1995 to 2008, and focusing on the case of 
Japan. 
Our main findings are as follows: The “acquisition” with the key role of “extension and 
growth” proved to have positive effects in the dynamic terms on target firms’ employment, 
mainly in manufacturing sector with high labor productivity; On the other hand, the “merger” 
with key function of “consolidation” turned out to have negative impacts dynamically on 
post-merger firms’ employment, mainly in non-manufacturing sector with low labor 
productivity. The strategic implication might to be that the different employment responses to 
M&A events between manufacturing and non-manufacturing reflect the difference in labor 
productivity between them, i.e. the dual structure of Japanese economy.
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Figure 1. M&A Developments in Number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. M&A Developments in Number Classified into Market Entry Style  
Total Deal Value
Number Portion % Number Portion % Number Portion % Number trillion yen
1985 161 61.9 78 30.0 21 8.1 260 n.a.
1986 223 53.3 181 43.3 14 3.3 418 n.a.
1987 206 53.9 158 41.4 18 4.7 382 n.a.
1988 218 41.7 291 55.6 14 2.7 523 n.a.
1989 245 38.0 388 60.2 12 1.9 645 n.a.
1990 268 35.5 463 61.4 23 3.1 754 n.a.
1991 309 48.4 301 47.2 28 4.4 638 n.a.
1992 253 52.4 186 38.5 44 9.1 483 n.a.
1993 234 58.9 120 30.2 43 10.8 397 n.a.
1994 249 49.3 196 38.8 60 11.9 505 n.a.
1995 255 48.0 222 41.8 54 10.2 531 n.a.
1996 320 51.5 239 38.5 62 10.0 621 n.a.
1997 453 60.2 224 29.7 76 10.1 753 2.24
1998 488 58.5 236 28.3 110 13.2 834 3.48
1999 721 61.7 266 22.8 182 15.6 1,169 18.09
2000 1,066 65.2 368 22.5 201 12.3 1,635 11.61
2001 1,190 72.0 289 17.5 174 10.5 1,653 8.28
2002 1,352 77.2 264 15.1 136 7.8 1,752 4.94
2003 1,352 78.2 213 12.3 163 9.4 1,728 5.80
2004 1,680 76.0 320 14.5 211 9.5 2,211 12.12
2005 2,129 78.1 411 15.1 185 6.8 2,725 11.74
2006 2,174 78.3 421 15.2 180 6.5 2,775 15.09
2007 2,020 74.9 367 13.6 309 11.5 2,696 12.45
2008 1,824 76.0 377 15.7 198 8.3 2,399 12.52
2009 1,520 77.7 299 15.3 138 7.1 1,957 7.24
Note) M&A inside the same group is excluded.
Source) MARR M&A Database presented by the RECOF.
IN-IN IN-OUT OUT-IN
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Table 2. Number of the Cases of M&A and Observed Firms 
①+②
M. Non-M. Total M. Non-M. Total
1995 - - - - - - - 5,936
1996 0 1 1 9 23 32 33 6,135
1997 0 0 0 16 22 38 38 6,293
1998 3 1 4 29 34 63 67 6,300
1999 0 2 2 50 62 112 114 6,342
2000 8 4 12 44 71 115 127 6,372
2001 16 21 37 53 85 138 175 6,407
2002 18 27 45 65 88 153 198 6,551
2003 22 21 43 69 107 176 219 6,424
2004 13 66 79 81 102 183 262 6,370
2005 24 70 94 91 127 218 312 6,370
2006 35 82 117 69 139 208 325 6,175
2007 34 68 102 87 153 240 342 5,949
2008 19 71 90 89 139 228 318 5,697
Total 192 434 626 752 1,152 1,904 2,530 9,880
2)
Note: 1) M: Manufacturing sector, Non-M. Non-Manufacturing sector
          2) The toal number is the one of firms observed between 1995 and 2008.
Acquisition ① Merger ② Observed
FirmsM&A Total
 
 
 11 
Table 3a. Results of Baseline Estimations 
E t
Const. -1.014 (0.177) *** -1.161 (0.437) *** -1.140 (0.434) ***
E t-1 0.966 (0.026) *** 0.965 (0.026) *** 0.968 (0.026) ***
Q t 0.257 (0.020) *** 0.262 (0.021) *** 0.258 (0.021) ***
Q t-1 -0.134 (0.020) *** -0.134 (0.020) *** -0.136 (0.020) ***
W t -0.208 (0.016) *** -0.205 (0.016) *** -0.204 (0.017) ***
W t-1 0.207 (0.016) *** 0.209 (0.016) *** 0.210 (0.016) ***
C t 0.011 (0.003) *** 0.010 (0.003) *** 0.010 (0.003) ***
C t-1 -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)
DAt -0.022 (0.018) -0.019 (0.018)
DAt-1 -0.190 (0.025) -0.019 (0.024)
DAt-2 0.021 (0.031) 0.023 (0.030)
DAt-3 0.049 (0.032) 0.048 (0.031)
DAt-4 0.063 (0.040) 0.067 (0.039) *
DAt-5 0.098 (0.045) ** 0.106 (0.044) **
DAt-6 0.130 (0.047) *** 0.131 (0.047) ***
DAt-7 0.126 (0.053) ** 0.129 (0.052) **
DAt-8 0.020 (0.074) 0.047 (0.070)
DAt-9 0.501 (0.074) 0.076 (0.070)
DAt-10 0.038 (0.074) 0.065 (0.069)
DMt 0.056 (0.011) *** 0.055 (0.011) ***
DMt-1 0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010)
DMt-2 -0.013 (0.012) -0.015 (0.012)
DMt-3 -0.022 (0.011) * -0.024 (0.011) **
DMt-4 -0.021 (0.012) * -0.022 (0.012) *
DMt-5 -0.020 (0.013) -0.020 (0.013)
DMt-6 0.003 (0.016) 0.003 (0.016)
DMt-7 -0.030 (0.017) * -0.031 (0.017) *
DMt-8 0.020 (0.018) 0.020 (0.018)
DMt-9 0.031 (0.020) 0.000 (0.019)
DMt-10 0.008 (0.022) 0.005 (0.022)
Industry D. Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) -14.432 *** -14.403 *** -14.357 ***
AR(2) 0.334 0.365 0.348
(Notes)
i) ***, **, and * indicate rejection at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant levels.

ii) AR(k) signify the coefficients in the test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero.
iii) Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
(c)(a) (b)
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Table 3b. Results of Estimations by Sector 
E t
Const. -0.890 (0.181) ***
E t-1 0.968 (0.023) ***
Q t 0.266 (0.020) ***
Q t-1 -0.155 (0.019) ***
W t -0.238 (0.018) ***
W t-1 0.200 (0.015) ***
C t 0.010 (0.002) ***
C t-1 -0.003 (0.002)
DA_m t -0.013 (0.019) DA_nm t -0.006 (0.030)
DA_m t-1 -0.029 (0.026) DA_nm t-1 0.035 (0.046)
DA_m t-2 0.126 (0.039) *** DA_nm t-2 0.020 (0.063)
DA_m t-3 0.150 (0.040) *** DA_nm t-3 0.081 (0.085)
DA_m t-4 0.156 (0.041) *** DA_nm t-4 0.166 (0.129)
DA_m t-5 0.173 (0.061) *** DA_nm t-5 0.383 (0.193) **
DA_m t-6 0.228 (0.063) *** DA_nm t-6 0.548 (0.306) *
DA_m t-7 0.169 (0.075) ** DA_nm t-7 0.904 (0.576)
DA_m t-8 0.086 (0.110) DA_nm t-8 2.812 (1.887)
DA_m t-9 collinearity DA_nm t-9 4.814 (3.191)
DA_m t-10 collinearity DA_nm t-10 6.774 (4.497)
DM_m t 0.079 (0.011) *** DM_nm t 0.031 (0.017) *
DM_m t-1 0.014 (0.011) DM_nm t-1 -0.038 (0.018) **
DM_m t-2 -0.026 (0.013) * DM_nm t-2 -0.060 (0.023) ***
DM_m t-3 0.000 (0.011) DM_nm t-3 -0.102 (0.026) ***
DM_m t-4 0.005 (0.011) DM_nm t-4 -0.099 (0.027) ***
DM_m t-5 0.002 (0.014) DM_nm t-5 -0.084 (0.025) ***
DM_m t-6 0.033 (0.016) ** DM_nm t-6 -0.078 (0.030) ***
DM_m t-7 0.009 (0.019) DM_nm t-7 -0.101 (0.031) ***
DM_m t-8 0.034 (0.020) DM_nm t-8 -0.044 (0.030)
DM_m t-9 0.034 (0.026) DM_nm t-9 -0.075 (0.027) ***
DM_m t-10 0.041 (0.028) DM_nm t-10 -0.075 (0.033) **
AR(1) -15.269 ***
AR(2) 0.675
(Notes)
i) ***, **, and * indicate rejection at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant levels.

ii) AR(k) signify the coefficients in the test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero.
iii) Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

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